The statistic about 12-13% of all incidents coming from non-phishing social engineering is eye-opening. What strikes me most is the help desk manipulation vector - it exploits the operational trust built into standard IT processes. The suggestion to simulate red team support impersonation attacks is excellent, but I wonder if most organizations have the maturity to run these drills without creating paranoia that hampers legitimate support workflows. The point about moving beyond static annual awarenss training to ongoing scenario-based approaches really resonates, especially given the cited study showing limited training effectiveness. The identity-centric monitoring recommendations are spot on.
Hey, great read as always; it’s almost impressive how creative attackers get with these non-phishing vectors that bypass traditional filtres, isnt it?
The statistic about 12-13% of all incidents coming from non-phishing social engineering is eye-opening. What strikes me most is the help desk manipulation vector - it exploits the operational trust built into standard IT processes. The suggestion to simulate red team support impersonation attacks is excellent, but I wonder if most organizations have the maturity to run these drills without creating paranoia that hampers legitimate support workflows. The point about moving beyond static annual awarenss training to ongoing scenario-based approaches really resonates, especially given the cited study showing limited training effectiveness. The identity-centric monitoring recommendations are spot on.